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ABSTRACT 
Greece was the first European Monetary Union country to sign a 
Memorandum with the European Commission and the European Central 
Bank in order to secure financial assistance and prevent a total collapse 
of its economy following the severe international economic crisis.  This 
Memorandum (2010), offered detailed steps of structural reforms that 
have affected all public services in Greece.  The lack of major results and 
the stickiness of the ‘Greek problem’ have made Greece a unique case-
study for evaluating both the recipe of the international donors and the 
domestic capacity for reform.  A historical institutionalist approach and 
the concept of ‘policy paradigm’ are combined in order to evaluate what 
are the conditions for a major administrative reform in time of crisis.  
The article focuses on the specific attempt to reform public 
administration during the Papandreou government in order to analyse 
the importance of both time and type of change in the success of a 
major reform programme.   
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The Eurozone Crisis and Austerity Politics:   
A Trigger for Administrative Reform in Greece? 
 
 
1. Introduction 
The economic crisis that spread across Europe in 2009 has produced a 
wave of public policy reforms in most European countries.  A 
combination of factors initially made Southern Europe, Ireland and 
especially Greece more vulnerable to speculative attacks and thus more 
affected by the crisis.  Greece was the first country to seek financial 
assistance from the European Union (EU) and as a result in March 2010 
the leaders of the Eurozone created a financial aid mechanism which 
involved the participation of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and 
of the Euro countries through bilateral agreements.  The European 
Commission and the European Central Bank (ECB) were made 
responsible for overviewing the implementation of the agreement and a 
Memorandum of economic and financial policies was signed in May 
2010.  The Memorandum, as well as the subsequent agreements of July 
21st and October 26th, clearly required public services reforms.  Public 
administration is still outlined as a key obstacle to recovery and further 
measures are proposed (OECD, 2011).  A number of reforms were 
initiated by the Papandreou government, most of them aiming at cost-
cutting and some of them aiming at more substantial changes.  This 
article constitutes a first attempt to evaluate the recipe as well as the 
impact of these reforms. 
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This particular moment in time apart from its political significance for 
the EU and for its member states, it also constitutes a unique 
opportunity for evaluating well-known public policy theoretical tools and 
for elaborating them.  Historical institutionalism (HI) claims that public 
policy and administration reforms are more likely to take place at 
‘critical junctures’ (Pierson, 2000).  Adopting this reasoning, this article 
argues that indeed change is more likely to occur in Greece, but also in 
other countries, during the current economic crisis - which can be 
described as a ‘critical juncture’.  The dominant governance paradigms 
across Europe, reliant on high public debts, have been called into 
question, and reforms are being proposed and adopted at a very fast 
pace.  Nevertheless, it is argued here, that the timing of the reform 
affects the type of change that take place.  In order to elaborate on the 
type of the reforms introduced during the current crisis, Hall’s (1993) 
distinction between incremental first and second order change and 
paradigm shift is combined with the concept of critical juncture.  A 
better understanding of time and a deeper analysis of change is exactly 
the theoretical aim of this article.   
The article is organized into four sections.  In the first section the 
theoretical argument and research design of the paper is developed and 
two theoretical propositions are put forward.  The second section 
outlines Greece’s dominant administrative paradigm and its key 
problems and failures in order to evaluate whether change is currently 
taking place.  The third section moves to a description of the exogenous 
pressures and of the recipe for change offered by the lenders.  The 
fourth section discusses the current public administration reform 
process and argues that up to now it mainly consists of first and second 
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order change.  The article concludes by returning to the propositions of 
the first section and drawing some more general conclusions about 
public administration reform during periods of crisis.  
 
2.  Theorizing the Timing and Type of Change 
Historical institutionalism (HI), more than the other neo-institutionalisms 
(sociological and rational choice institutionalisms), offers a framework 
useful for understanding the timing of inertia but also the timing of 
change (Hay and Wincott, 1998).   Its advantage is that it brings politics 
into the equation in a dynamic way (Thelen, 1999, p. 384).  In this 
instance, this means that although economics seem to lead 
developments in EU member-states, HI helps us focus on politics in 
order to better understand why change is promoted in some issues 
while inertia persists in other types of policy problems.  HI acknowledges 
the importance of time, timing and tempo and offers a set of concepts 
such as ‘path dependence’, ‘critical junctures’ and ‘increasing returns’ in 
order to understand the temporal dimension of change.  Levi (1997, p. 
28) explains that when a country starts following one path the cost of 
changing paths becomes very high and that is why path dependence 
occurs.  The path dependence concept has developed even further 
through the idea of increasing returns which describes the cost of 
changing paths, the importance of the timing of change and the 
sequence of paths.  According to increasing returns, the cost of 
remaining in the same path is usually significantly lower than the cost of 
changing paths (e.g. Pierson, 2004).  Up to now, and as discussed in 
more detail in the next section, Greece’s recent administrative history 
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seems perfectly to fit the idea of a country that has fallen into path 
dependence and where increasing returns have not been facilitating 
change.  It is argued that the current economic crisis has changed the 
increasing returns in relation to administrative change and the country is 
in search of a new equilibrium.  This is a typical example of a critical 
juncture.    
Critical junctures refer to those historical moments, such as the current 
economic crisis, that have a lasting impact upon countries.   They can be 
small or bigger events, provided that the timing is right and that their 
effect is lasting (Pierson, 2000).  Pierson (2000) notes that institutions 
‘lock in’ and they are often considered to be the best possible choice.  In 
a way, institutions limit the agents’ perspective about alternatives and as 
a result the status quo is reinforced.  The first aim of this article is to 
elaborate the concept of critical juncture, by using the example of 
Greece during the current economic crisis.  For a critical juncture to lead 
to change, three parameters are expected to play an important role: 
exogenous forces, endogenous circumstances or the result of a 
particular group or individual coming to power (Bulmer and Burch, 
1998).  Nevertheless, although it can be argued that a historical moment 
such as the current economic crisis is a critical juncture, it is more 
difficult to establish causality between the critical juncture and change 
at the domestic level (for example in Greece).  In order, to proceed, an in 
depth understanding of change is necessary.      
Hall’s (1993) work proves to be particularly useful here because his 
sociological institutionalist (SI) approach adds some clarity to the 
concept.  He distinguishes between simple change and radical 
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transformation.  He claims that three distinct types of policy change 
exist: a) first order change which refers to instrument settings change 
while overall goals and policy instruments remain the same; b) second 
order change when both policy instruments and their settings change 
but policy goals remain the same and c) third order change (or policy 
paradigm change) which occurs rarely but when it happens is radical and 
involves a change of the “framework of ideas and standards that 
specifies not only the goals of policy and the kind of instruments that 
can be used to attain them, but also the very nature of the problems 
they are meant to be addressing” (Hall, 1993, p. 279).  First and second 
order change are incremental while paradigm shift, as Hall (1993) 
argues, does not necessarily follow first and second order change and it 
is not incremental in nature.  In this article, it is argued that we need to 
combine the discussion about critical junctures that shed light on the 
timing of change with Hall’s deeper understanding of the concept of 
change in order to explore when a country is more likely to shift 
paradigms.  Our focus is administrative change in Greece in the time of 
the economic crisis.  
The conditions of a paradigmatic shift that Hall (1993) describes are a 
good starting point in our discussion of the Greek case.  Hall claims that: 
first, the change from one paradigm to another is not just the result of a 
shift in the views of experts but a much more political action.  In other 
words, it is not only about ideas but also about interests.  Experts have 
conflicting views and some of them will contribute to the discourse 
behind the change but the process itself is political and involves internal 
and external factors that empower one new direction over another. 
Following the historical institutionalist discussion, we could add here, 
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that the particular timing affects the direction and the depth of change.  
Second, the authority over policy is of particular importance.  During a 
paradigmatic shift, there will be changes “in the locus of authority over 
policy” which means that the ownership of the policy will change (Hall, 
1993, p. 280).  It is argued here that the ownership of the policy should 
be combined with a strong and persuasive new authority, in order for 
the paradigm shift to take place.  Third, policy experimentation and 
policy failure are central in the movement from one paradigm to 
another.  Policy experimentation is different to what is described as first 
and second-order change and refers to convulsive and random change 
which governments prefer in order to avoid the costs of full reform. It is 
a common process to introduce reforms aiming to adjust the previous 
paradigm to a new situation.  This type of change is similar to Thelen’s 
(2003) institutional layering.  Such adjustments often lack intellectual 
and policy coherence and the result is policy failure.  Policy failure and 
policy experimentation can feed into the process of paradigm shift (Hall, 
1993).   
In summary, it is proposed that: 
 In order to understand administrative reform two parameters 
should be analysed and combined: the time and the type of 
change. 
 For a policy paradigm shift to take place, a critical juncture is a 
necessary but not a sufficient condition.  Policy experimentation 
and policy failure are equally likely. 
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In the next sections, the two propositions are further discussed in light 
of the Greek case. The empirical material presented in the article is the 
outcome of extensive fieldwork (collection of documents and elite 
interviews) that took place in Athens between April and November 2011.  
The timing of the fieldwork has been interesting because it occurred one 
year after the agreement of the first Memorandum, in the midst of what 
was described as ‘reform fatigue’ and with the international pressure for 
reforms escalating.  Comparisons with other EMU member-states that 
are in a similar situation are offered when necessary, although this 
article is primarily an in-depth discussion of the latest public 
administration reform in Greece and of the theoretical and empirical 
lessons that we can draw from it.  We now turn to the description of the 
dominant governance paradigm in Greece in order to evaluate whether 
the reform that is currently taking place could be described as an 
administrative paradigm shift or whether the changes observed are 
incremental. 
 
3.  Dominant Administrative Paradigm in Greece 
In accordance with the key doctrines of HI, in order to understand 
change at a particular moment in time we have to discuss what existed 
before.  In order to evaluate whether paradigm shift is taking place we 
need to explore how problems and their solutions were perceived 
before the crisis.  In this section it is shown that, the ‘dominant’ 
governance paradigm in Greece is best described as a quasi-Weberian 
hierarchical bureaucracy.  Following Howlett and Ramesh’s (1998) 
distinction between ‘dominant’ and ‘hegemonic’ paradigm, it is argued 
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that hierarchy in Greece is a dominant and not a hegemonic paradigm.  
A paradigm is described as hegemonic when only one, unchallenged 
model exists which is supported by a closed policy community.  In 
Greece, challenges to hierarchy, both towards more liberal and more 
social directions, have been present for a long time, supported by 
different networks, and that is why the term ‘dominant paradigm’ is 
more accurate.  Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1993) argue that which 
network predominates over the others, and thus which paradigm 
becomes dominant, largely depends on external factors.   
Greece, according to Ongaro (2009), can be categorized together with 
France, Italy, Portugal and Spain, as a Napoleonic state, at least as far as 
the common roots of their public administrations is concerned.  They all 
derive from France.  Of course, as Ongaro (2009) explains, the changes 
seen in all five countries over the years have been many and substantial. 
The current governance model in Greece was established in the 1970s in 
light of Greece’s transition to democracy but also in light of the 
economic stringency of the period.  This transition can be described as a 
first critical juncture for the Greek public administration. The 
conservative party of New Democracy (ND) under the leadership of 
Konstantinos Karamanlis held power until 1981. It is argued that this 
year, was a second critical juncture because Greece became a full 
member of the European Community (EC).  In 1981, the Panhellenic 
Socialist Movement (PASOK) took office, with Andreas Papandreou 
initially as the Prime Minister and with Costas Simitis as the Prime 
Minister since 1996.  Greece’s entry in the EMU in 2001 is the third 
critical juncture in its modern administrative history.   
  9 
The first two critical junctures outlined above were signified by 
important attempts to change the administrative model in Greece.  In 
the first period, from 1974 until 1981, the main problems that the state 
perceived as priorities were the consolidation of democracy and the 
international position of the country.  Thus, the democratic institutions 
of the country were reinforced via legislative and administrative 
measures and effort was put into preparing the country for entering the 
European Community (EC).  More specifically, the Karamanlis 
government strengthened the executive and emphasized the 
importance of having a distinct public administration.  The public sector 
grew via the nationalization of enterprises facing financial problems (e.g. 
Emporiki Bank) and the establishment of new public organizations (e.g. 
Ministry of Town Planning and Environment), (Sotiropoulos, 2007, pp. 
109-11).  The administrative changes that took place in this period can 
be described as third order changes, following Hall’s classification.      
From 1981 onwards, when Andreas Papandreou took office, the main 
concern was the growth of GDP, the reduction of unemployment rates 
and the strengthening of the lower social classes.  As a result new 
welfare institutions were created and the public sector grew even larger.  
Some efforts were made towards the training of public servants and 
decentralization. Pagoulatos (2003), notes that in the 1980’s the state 
model in place is best described as developmental.  Again, during this 
critical juncture for reasons related to the socialist ideology of PASOK as 
well as a result of Greece’s adaptation to the aquis communautaire and 
the EC’s cohesion policy and related funding, the administrative changes 
that took place are best described as paradigmatic.   
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Nevertheless, PASOK as well as the ND government, that took office in 
1989, were caught between changes for the professionalization of public 
administration and the use of the state for electoral reasons.  Some signs 
of public administration modernization can be traced after 1993 when 
the Simitis government (PASOK), in its efforts to join the EMU, 
introduced Independent Authorities such as the Supreme Council for 
Civil Personnel Selection (ASEP) in 1994 and the Greek Ombudsman in 
1997 (Sotiropoulos, 2007, pp. 134-45).  Pagoulatos (2003) describes this 
period as the beginning of the stabilization model. Although, the entry of 
Greece in the EMU in 2001 can be characterized as a third critical 
juncture, the administrative changes that followed were only 
incremental.  Although the entry in the EMU was a very important shift 
towards the liberalization of the economy, it cannot be claimed that the 
way public policy problems and their solutions were perceived, had 
radically changed. Quite the opposite, the state continued growing and 
with it the public debt also increased.   
Greek public administration has remained hierarchical and centralized 
through the years as far as its institutions and control mechanisms are 
concerned.  It has been characterized by a low degree of legitimacy and 
the administrative system has been dominated by the party in 
government which meant that continuity in governance could not be 
guaranteed (Spanou, 1998).  Two of the most common accusations 
against public administration in Greece have been lack of effectiveness 
and widespread corruption.  Especially corruption at the lowest level of 
the administration is considered to be particularly high (Interviews 1 to 
5).  Patronage, which is caused by the dominance of the party in rule, 
has possibly been the most important reason for the failure of Greek 
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public administration.  It has been undermining the technical and 
personnel capacity of public administration by violating the values of 
meritocracy in the selection and development of personnel but also in 
public procurement.  In a way, patronage in many instances has been 
the main cause of corruption and of ineffectiveness.      
Another aspect of the dominant paradigm in Greece has been legalism 
and formalism which is not followed by controls and sanctions of law-
breakers.  Quite the opposite, respect for formal rule has been 
fragmented and informal practices have habitually violated or ignored 
formal rules (Spanou, 1996).  The large number of often conflicting 
regulations has frequently been the result of client-patron relations and 
of attempts to offer benefits to specific social groups in order to secure 
re-election (Sotiropoulos, 2007).  Similarly to the Italian case, the 
existence of a strong policy community of constitutional and public law 
experts has further strengthened legalism (Capano, 2003).  These 
experts by acting as consultants for all governments in the last 30 years 
but also serving as ministers or in other high-rank positions in the 
administration have by and large been the intellectual elite behind the 
dominant paradigm.  
The current economic crisis that Greece is facing has proven that the 
cost of state inefficiencies can be very high for the government.  Two 
characteristics of the state-economy relationship have been blamed 
above all for the weakness of the Greek economy.  Firstly, tax evasion by 
individuals - but even more importantly by businesses – has been 
common.  Irregular payments by businesses during tax collection have 
been widespread and as a result significant amounts never entered the 
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treasury.  Secondly, state spending on social protection has been high 
while the results have been open to question.  Public expenditure on 
social provision has increased over the years but its coverage has been 
skewed.  Spending on family and unemployment benefits has been low, 
while the cost of pensions has been high (Featherstone and 
Papadimitriou, 2008, pp. 57-60).   
The policy legacy of public administration and the path that has been 
followed up to now means that the institutions and practices described 
have locked-in and that reform initiatives have been very difficult to 
implement.  Greece has been described as ‘une société bloqué’ 
(Featherstone, 2005).  Processes of Europeanization could have 
facilitated the emergence of a new administrative paradigm but the 
results have been rather poor.  The literature on Europeanization and 
Greece shows that there is a tendency to convergence, but there are still 
a large number of cases of inertia (Ladi, 2011).  Inertia has been 
observed in policy areas such as pension reform (Featherstone, 2003), 
administrative reform (Spanou, 2001) and environmental policy change 
(Ladi, 2007).   Examples of all kinds of domestic mediating factors mainly 
obstructing the Europeanization of Greek policies can be found in the 
literature.  The most usual factors are political institutional capacity, 
policy legacies and policy preferences.  Instances of resilience to change 
can be found in all sectors and normally all three mediating factors seem 
to be present.  For example, the EU cohesion policy had to confront a 
centralised government, lack of coordination, strong political parties and 
a lack of political will for change.  The result has been that although 
some institutional changes have been introduced, the regions remained 
weak and the absorption of structural funds was limited 
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(Paraskevopoulos, 2001; Andreou, 2006).  Change can only be observed 
in policy objectives, styles and practices which are best classified as first 
and second order change.  
 
4.  The International Economic Crisis as a Critical Juncture: 
Recipes for Change 
In this section the current international economic and political situation 
is described as a critical juncture for Greece.  There are two dimensions 
in the Greek governmental discourse concerning the necessity of the 
reforms: the global and the European.  More specifically, during the 
Papandreou government, the global dimension and specifically the 
reaction of the global financial markets was and is still perceived as the 
tip of the iceberg that almost caused the collapse of the Greek economy.  
The economic crisis was presented as the absolute push for reform.  The 
European dimension was presented as the solution to the problem via 
the first Memorandum of economic and financial policies that was 
agreed between the Greek government, the European Commission and 
the ECB (e.g. Interview 1).  In the rest of the section, it is shown that the 
international economic crisis is a critical juncture for Greece and that the 
changes that have been taking place will have a lasting effect upon the 
country.  The focus here is on the exogenous pressure and on the recipe 
for change. 
The financial crisis of 2007-8 has given credence to the supporters of the 
globalization thesis and of its impact upon states (e.g. Cerny, 2010).   The 
first wave of the crisis which was caused by the collapse of the American 
investment Bank Lehman Brothers, was followed by a second wave, that 
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of governments’ budget deficits and of their ability to repay them.  A 
number of reasons, including the Greek prime minister’s admission of 
the Greek public deficit being much higher than previously calculated 
(from 3.6% of GDP it was revised to 12.8% and in 2010 it was further 
increased to 13.6%), turned speculators against Greece.  Soon, Ireland 
and Portugal followed and in November of 2011 the pressure on Italy, 
Spain and Belgium seriously intensified.  The Eurozone found itself in the 
most difficult situation since its creation. The severity of the Greek 
economic crisis became apparent at the end of 2009 when financial 
ratings agencies downgraded their credit rating for Greece, and the 
government realized that it was unable to serve its massive debts.  This 
situation meant that at the beginning of 2010 the dominant governance 
paradigm of Greece was no longer only the concern of the Greek 
government.  The financial markets and the members of the Eurozone 
started keeping a close eye on what was happening in Greece.  
Greece was the first country to seek financial assistance from the EU in 
February of 2010.  European leaders promised to take determined and 
coordinated action to prevent the possibility of Greek default and to 
guarantee the stability of the Eurozone.  As a result, in March 2010, a 
financial aid mechanism, which involved the participation of the IMF and 
of the Euro countries through bilateral agreements, was created.  The 
European Commission and the ECB were made responsible for 
overseeing the implementation of the agreement, and a Memorandum 
of economic and financial policies, as well as a Memorandum of 
Understanding on specific economic policy conditionality were signed in 
May 2010.  The Memoranda clearly specified public services reforms.  
The most coercive phase of Greece’s Europeanization since its entry into 
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the EU in 1981 had just started.  This is what Featherstone (2011) 
described as ‘Über Europeanization’.  Similar Memoranda were signed 
with Ireland in December 2010 and with Portugal in May 2011.  The Irish 
Memorandum hardly mentions public administration reforms while the 
Portuguese Memorandum is much less intrusive in the public 
administration reforms prescribed.  The agreement of the 26th of 
October 2011 between Greece and its lenders for a ‘haircut’ led to a 
second Memorandum voted by the Greek Parliament in February of 
2012.  This article focuses only on the 1st Memorandum and on the 
reforms that were initiated by the Papandreou government in order to 
keep some distance from the object of analysis and to better evaluate 
this first period of reform. 
The Greek Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies (2010) 
outlines three areas of reform: fiscal policies, financial sector policies 
and structural policies.  What is of interest for the purpose of this article 
is the reform of structural policies, which includes public services and 
has been proven to be the stickiest area of reform. A brief discussion of 
the fiscal and financial sector policies is provided in order to 
demonstrate the universality of the reform process and the possibility of 
unintended consequences because of multiple and simultaneous 
reforms.  As far as fiscal policies are concerned, the initial agreement 
was that the general government deficit would be reduced below 3% of 
GDP by 2014.  At the same time, expenditure should have been cut by 
7% of GDP and revenue should have been increased by 4% of GDP.  In 
order to achieve these targets major structural fiscal reforms including 
pension reform, health sector reform, tax reform, public financial 
management, fiscal framework and debt management framework 
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modernization were demanded and initiated.  All in all though, these 
targets proved to be unrealistic and the second Memorandum has set 
new ones.  Concerning the financial sector policies, the challenge noted 
by the first Memorandum was the management by the Banks of the 
tight liquidity conditions and thus the primary concern was to preserve 
the financial sector’s soundness and its capacity to support the Greek 
economy.   After the ‘haircut’ decided in October 2011, this has become 
any even more demanding task.  The structural policies, which was the 
third category of reforms agreed, directly targeted the dominant 
administrative paradigm and included plans for the modernization of 
public administration, the restructuring of labor markets and income 
policies, the improvement of the business environment and of 
competitiveness, the rationalization of public enterprises and the 
improvement of the absorption of EU structural and cohesion funds.    
The Greek economy was the first Eurozone economy that found itself 
under international control by its donors, who are European but also 
international.  Interestingly, the conditions under which Greece agreed 
to get its loans involved clear measures for radical structural reform 
which would have lasting impact upon its administrative system.  It can 
be claimed thus that this particular historical moment is a critical 
juncture for Greece and that the exogenous pressure is high.  In the next 
section, the administrative reforms initiated by the Papandreou 
government, as a result of the Memorandum, are discussed in order to 
evaluate the type of change that has taken place at this particular 
moment in time.  It is argued that the nature of the recipe suggested by 
the lenders was mainly cost-cutting and structural. 
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5. Public Administration Reform: Towards a Paradigm Shift? 
The Papandreou government’s attempt to initiate public administration 
reform in response to the first Memorandum is a very interesting case 
for showing that radical change does not always take place at critical 
junctures.  In this section, it is explored whether this particular critical 
juncture has been a sufficient condition for paradigm change.  In order 
to do that the public administration changes outlined in the 
Memorandum (2010) and initiated by the Papandreou government 
(2009-2011) are discussed, evaluated and classified as first, second or 
third order changes.  It is argued that an important part of the reforms 
are only cost-cutting which means that they can just be classified as 
incremental change.     
The Memorandum (2010, pp. 78-9) clearly sets the public administration 
reforms and their time frame as conditions for the payment of the loan 
that has been agreed.  In the rest of this section, the reforms initiated by 
the Papandreou government are presented and their level of 
implementation up to November of 2011, when the government fell, is 
evaluated: 
1) Public sector employment changes: the aim was to adopt a unified 
remuneration system that would cover basic wages and allowances 
of all public sector employees.  Additionally, it was agreed that 
remuneration should reflect productivity and tasks.  In order to 
achieve that, as requested, a Single Payment Authority was 
established and the payment of all civil servants’ salaries was 
expected to be centralized (Law Gazette no. 784, 4/6/10).  Full 
implementation of the unified remuneration system was initially 
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planned for September of 2011, but the relevant law was published 
at the end of October 2011 (Law Gazette no. 226, 27/10/11).  The 
actual implementation of the law started in January of 2012, with 
the gradual application of the new legislation to different categories 
of public sector employees.  What is even more telling is that not 
much happened in making wages reflect productivity and tasks, 
although the time frame was for September of 2010.  As far as the 
quality of public services is concerned, such an action would be much 
more important.  Such a reform would signify a move towards 
private sector practices which would be a radical change and not just 
a spending-cut (or first order) change. 
 An additional reform announced, was that the Supreme Council for 
Civil Personnel Selection (ASEP) was from now on going to be 
responsible not only for all public sector recruitment but also for the 
promotion of public servants (Interview 2).  The Explanatory Report 
(2011) of the Intermediate Framework of the Public Finance Strategy 
2012-15 announced a new human resources management system 
that would allow for the use of personnel according to their 
knowledge and capabilities.  This new system would facilitate 
personnel mobility between different public sector organizations.  
Not such legislation has been adopted yet and in reality what we see 
is a freeze of promotions in order not to increase salary-related 
costs.   
 Another change announced by the Papandreou government was that 
the public sector employees’ penalty legislation would become 
stricter in order to achieve better accountability.  As a result it was 
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expected that the role of the trade unions would be minimized.  No 
legislation was introduced by the end of the Papandreou 
government.  A draft law was finally sent to Parliament in January of 
2012.   
 In summary, it can be argued that the key goal was to keep 
recruitment in the public sector very low (1 recruit for every 5 
retirements, while for 2011 it was 1 recruit for every 10 retirements) 
and to cut spending (a minimum 30% cut was applied to public 
servants salaries) (Memorandum, 2010).  Given that the dismissal of 
public servants is legally and politically very difficult in Greece, the 
labor reserve idea was adopted for 30.000 public servants in 
November of 2011 in order to reduce spending even further.  All 
these changes are mainly cost-cutting and they cannot be described 
as paradigmatic.  Nevertheless, if the fact that employment at the 
public sector is no longer conceived as safe and economically 
advantageous is further strengthened, it can indeed lead to 
paradigmatic change in the future.  Thus, such a claim cannot be 
made about the public employment reforms introduced by the 
Papandreou government.     
2) Public procurement: e-procurement for all sectors and levels of 
government was initially planned for the end of 2010, but in July 
2011 the contract for the provision of the electronic platform had 
still not been signed (European Commission, 2011b).  The 
consultation for the establishment of an independent authority 
overseeing public procurement was finalized in February of 2011 
(http://www.opengov.gr/ypoian/).  The draft law was sent to 
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Parliament in February 2011 and was voted in August of 2011 (Law 
Gazette no.204/A, 15/9/11).     
 The reform in the field of public procurement aims to improve the 
transparency and accountability of the contracts between the public 
and the private sectors.  Although the result is not expected to be a 
third-order change it could be characterized as second-order change 
because it could reinforce a more just evaluation of public 
competitions and thus improve the quality of public services.  It is 
clear though that the Papandreou government did not manage to 
finalise this reform.      
3) Transparency of public spending: the government early on agreed to 
ensure transparency of public spending by publishing online all 
public spending decisions.  Indeed, via the ‘Cl@rity’ programme all 
public entities’ decisions should be published online and they cannot 
be implemented unless they are uploaded on the Clarity website 
(http://diavgeia.gov.gr/en).  Progress in this field was acknowledged 
by the Interim report (EC, 2010).  It is interesting that the 
government moved one step forward from what was prescribed in 
the Memorandum and made compulsory the online publication of all 
decisions - not only the ones concerned with public spending. 
 Cl@rity is seen as a reform that has been completed successfully 
although it cannot be characterized as radical (e.g. Interview 2).  It is 
interesting to note that its main aim is to enhance transparency by 
using new electronic means.  It can be classified as second-order 
change because the policy instruments have changed but not the 
goals. 
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4) Local administration reform: the requirement was to adopt 
legislation reforming local government by June of 2010.  In fact, as of 
1st of January 2011 a law, incorporating prefectures into regions and 
thus reducing their number from 76 to 13 and at the same time 
reducing municipalities from 1034 to 325 and municipal enterprises 
from 6000 to 1500 started being implemented.  The reform has been 
named ‘Kallikratis’.  It is expected to lead to 0.5% of GDP budgetary 
savings by the end of 2015 as well as more efficient provision of 
public services (http://kallikratis.ypes.gr/).  Nevertheless, the 
challenge ahead is huge until the transfer of responsibilities and 
resources is completed. (Interview 2). 
 ‘Kallikratis’ is one of the reforms that has been implemented at a fast 
pace and its key aims are to minimize cost but also to improve the 
results of the services provided by local government.  It is a second 
order change because although it does not change the goals of local 
administration, it reshuffles the responsibilities between local 
governments and regions. 
5) Review of central government: the agreement via the Memorandum 
(2010) was to perform an independent review of the organization 
and functioning of the central administration in order to adopt 
measures for the rationalization of the use of resources, the 
organization of public administration and the effectiveness of social 
programmes.  It was soon decided to produce two separate reviews: 
one for central government (overseen by the Ministry of the Interior) 
and one for the social programmes (overseen by the Ministry of 
Labor).  After continuous delays (EC 2011a), only the review of 
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central administration was published by the OECD in November of 
2011 (OECD, 2011).  Soon after the fall of the Papandreou 
government, in January of 2012, a lot of the suggestions made by the 
OECD were incorporated in a White Paper on Governance.    
 It is important to note that the both the OECD review and the White 
Paper just make proposals about the changes that should happen.  
Suggestions not very different or original from what has already 
been discussed for a long time about the necessity of public 
administration reform (i.e. Spanou, 2008).  The fact remains that no 
significant change can be observed, during the Papandreou 
government, in central government which is one of the most 
problematic areas of Greek public administration.   
6) Better Regulation: the aim is to implement the Better Regulation 
Agenda and to ensure the reduction of administrative burdens on 
citizens and enterprises.  After more than one year delay a better 
regulation law was given for consultation in August of 2011 but its 
vote was not completed during the Papandreou government.  The 
law was finally voted in February of 2012 (Law Gazette no.34/A, 
23/2/12).  It introduced the Regulatory Impact Analysis (RIA) and it is 
in line with the OECD Better Regulation Agenda.  During the 
Papandreou government no change was observed.  Nevertheless, 
the new law can be described as second-order change because it 
does introduce new policy instruments for the improvement of 
regulation.   
Apart from the Memorandum reforms, a framework law for electronic 
governance was voted (Law Gazette no.138, 16/6/11) and in the 
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Explanatory Report (2011) of the Intermediate Programme the 
completion of the modernized communication system between public 
organizations was announced.  It was also planned to transform Citizens’ 
Service Centers into Unified Service Centers for both citizens and 
enterprises and to create an Innovation and Documentation Center 
within the National Centre for Public Administration and Local 
Government (Explanatory Report, 2011).  International trends such as 
decentralization, e-governance, more flexible human resource 
management and above all a campaign to reduce costs are evident in 
the reform programme of the Papandreou government.   If we add to 
that the pension reform, the health care reform, the plan to reduce 
school numbers and universities as well as the public enterprises 
privatization plans and the ‘recovery plan’ for the railway sector and for 
public transport, it becomes apparent that a major reform with 
unintended consequences is currently under way.  Nevertheless, 
paradigm shift has not taken place yet.  The public administration 
reforms discussed in this section are either cut-spending or incremental 
(first and second-order change).  Let’s now turn back to our theoretical 
propositions.  
 
6. What Went Wrong? Lessons Learned 
The discussion of the impact of the economic crisis upon public 
administration reform in the Greek case gives us the opportunity to 
venture on a more theoretical discussion by taking into consideration 
the two propositions outlined in the first section of the article.  Such a 
discussion can be enlightening for the understanding of the direction 
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and the success rate of public administration reforms in other Eurozone 
countries under the current wave of austerity measures, triggered by the 
public debt crisis.    
In the first section it was argued that in order to understand 
administrative reform two parameters should be analysed and 
combined: the time and the type of change.  Indeed, the case of Greece 
shows that the exact time of the reform can either facilitate or delay the 
intended change.  The discussion of critical junctures sheds light on the 
moments in time when change is more possible to occur.  Nevertheless, 
it is significant to note that even if the timing is right, the consolidation 
of radical change takes time (i.e. Pierson, 2004).  This means that it is 
very unlikely to observe radical change in the time space of one or two 
years.  Furthermore, it is important to evaluate the direction towards 
which the external pressure for change is aimed at.  This takes us to the 
second dimension which is the analysis of the type of change that takes 
place.  As it is evident from the discussion of the administrative reforms 
initiated by the Papandreou government, it is more possible to observe 
governments pushing forward incremental or cost-cutting changes 
rather than radical change, even when the time is right.  In the case of 
Greece, cost-cutting and not structural was the main aim of the reform, 
in order to quickly comply with the international loans economic targets.  
The second proposition outlined in this article attempts to combine 
these two key dimensions for the understanding of change.  
It is argued, that for a policy paradigm shift to take place, a critical 
juncture is a necessary but not a sufficient condition.  Policy 
experimentation and policy failure are equally likely and they can feed 
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into a paradigm shift at a later time.  Our focus here is at the 
administrative level and the possibility of a paradigm shift. It can be 
argued that of the previous Greek administrative reforms discussed, only 
two involved a radical change in the understanding of policy problems 
and their solutions that contributed to a paradigm shift.  The first started 
in 1974, when the consolidation of democracy and the strengthening of 
the country’s international position was the lens through which the 
problems were viewed.  Indeed, we can talk about an administrative 
paradigm shift at this period when new institutions and rules were 
established and the key institutions of the Greek modern state were 
consolidated.  Joining the EC in 1981 was a second critical juncture for 
Greece and a paradigm shift can be observed once more.  The new 
government that came to power in 1981 also changed the perspective 
by focusing on social justice and GDP growth and reinforced radical 
administrative changes (e.g. creation of a National Health System) which 
signified the establishment of a welfare state in Greece.   
On the other hand, the significant but not radical administrative changes 
(e.g. creation of administrative authorities) that took place after 1993 in 
light of the EMU participation were incremental and there was no real 
change in the perspective through which the problems were seen.  
Joining the EMU was a critical juncture but no paradigm shift can be 
observed.  The fact that joining the EMU did not lead to a paradigm shift, 
means that the exogenous pressures for change were not strong 
enough, that the endogenous circumstances did not favor radical change 
and that no specific opportunity for action was created (see for example 
Featherstone, 2003).  Although, it is still early days to judge whether the 
critical juncture of the current economic crisis will lead to an 
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administrative paradigm shift for Greece, an initial evaluation of the 
administrative reforms pursued by the Papandreou government is 
possible.  Two key observations can be made: First, the exogenous 
pressure from the markets and from the first Memorandum, were 
strongly pointing to radical administrative reforms, with a primary aim to 
reduce public sector cost.  Second, there was a shift at the governmental 
level in the way the problem was being addressed.  The focus now was 
on reducing public debt in order to keep one’s position at the European 
table and to sustain the possibility of decent living standards for the 
majority of the population. This means that the necessary conditions for 
policy paradigm shift were present.  Nevertheless, these conditions did 
not prove to be sufficient, at least during the Papandreou government. 
The delays in most of the administrative reforms and the incremental 
nature of the few reforms that were implemented, signifies policy 
experimentation in order to avoid harsh governmental decisions and 
conflict with the organized interests. The result in some cases was policy 
failure and in other cases was inertia.   
If we take this finding further, in line with Hall’s (1993) argument, it can 
be claimed that although exogenous and endogenous events are 
important parameters of a critical juncture, the most important 
condition for a paradigm shift to be concluded is a coherent, strong and 
persuasive domestic political authority steering the reforms.  As far as 
the Greek case is concerned, a new socialist government was elected in 
autumn of 2009 and it is this government that was managing the reform 
process up to November of 2011.  Giorgos Papandreou brought with him 
his own national consultants and organized a small group of 
international experts to help him with the reform process (Kovaios, 
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2010).  However, this group of national and international experts was 
neither powerful nor fresh and thus it is difficult to claim that it was very 
persuasive.  The policy coherence of the reform was even more difficult 
to establish.  In fact, the government was in the difficult position of 
having socialist values and roots and at the same time pushing for huge 
public spending cuts.  The government came into power with a discourse 
about green development and open governance (PASOK 2009) and it has 
found itself in a situation of limited resources and an agenda with 
different priorities dictated by its international donors.  In November of 
2011, the Papandreou government was replaced by a government of 
national unity after domestic and European pressure.  The new Prime 
Minister L. Papadimos, who is a technocrat and not a politician, has been 
assigned with the limited duty to complete the negotiations for the 
‘haircut’ of the Greek public debt and to pursue the necessary reforms 
for the next loan agreement between the Greek government and its 
lenders.  Towards this direction a second Memorandum was voted by 
the Greek parliament in February of 2012.  
 
7. Conclusions 
The financial crisis that started in the US in 2007-8 quickly spread across 
the world; it mutated according to the weaknesses of each country, but 
definitely had one common characteristic across the globe.  It has 
caused a debate about public spending cuts, efficiency of the state and 
rationalization of public services.  Greece is one of the most interesting 
cases because although it is a member of the EMU, and possibly because 
of that, it has found itself in the middle of the European crisis.  Its 
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economy came near to collapse and it has still not recovered and a loan 
from the IMF and from EMU members was the only realistic solution.  
The loan came with Memoranda overseen by the EC and the ECB which 
clearly stipulated public services reforms.  In this article it was argued 
that Greece is still not moving towards an administrative paradigm shift 
and what we observe is mainly policy experimentation and cost-cutting 
changes. 
The data available up to now allows us to come to some initial but 
interesting empirical and theoretical conclusions.  As far as Greece is 
concerned first, it can be claimed that the reforms that have been 
adopted or planned in the last year are indeed addressing some of the 
main flaws of the dominant paradigm such as lack of effectiveness, 
corruption and tax evasion.  Nevertheless, the pace of the reforms is 
slow, delays are observed and an implementation gap can be noticed.  
Second, the importance of the exogenous factors in the reform process 
allows us to argue that this is the most coercive phase of Greece’s 
Europeanization since its entry in the EC.  It would be interesting to 
conduct more research into this issue because it is expected to produce 
interesting material not only for Greece but also for the literature on 
Europeanization.  Third, the key reasons that could halt the paradigm 
shift process are: unintended consequences because of the large 
number of simultaneous reforms taking place, extensive policy failure 
and policy experimentation, and most significantly domestic political 
authority, if it proves to be less powerful than necessary.     
Critical junctures and paradigm shift have proved to be useful concepts 
for the discussion of the Greek public administration reform in light of 
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the current economic crisis.  At the same time, the Greek case has 
allowed us to gain a fresh view of these concepts and to combine them 
in an interesting way.  Linking paradigm shifts with critical junctures and 
focusing both on the time but also on the type of change, has proved to 
be fruitful and additional research will allow us to take the findings of 
this linkage even further.  The Greek case shows that although the 
exogenous parameters were key for the initiation of the reforms the 
actual outcome of the process is mainly a domestic issue.  The strength 
of the domestic political authority to steer the paradigm shift is possibly 
the most important factor for a critical juncture to lead to a paradigm 
shift.  The current economic crisis may prove to be an opportunity not 
only for the countries involved and for the Eurozone but also for the 
deepening of the study of public policy change. 
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